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Preface 
This is one of a series of working papers which form the first stage of a programme of research, Social 
Policy in a Cold Climate, designed to examine the effects of the major economic and political changes in 
the UK since 2007, particularly their impact on the distribution of wealth, poverty, income inequality and 
spatial difference. The  full programme of analysis will include policies and spending decisions from the 
last period of the Labour government (2007-2010), including the beginning of the financial crisis, as well 
as those made by the Coalition government since May 2010. The programme is funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation and the Nuffield Foundation, with London-specific analysis funded by the Trust for 
London. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the funders.  
 
The research is taking place from October 2011 to May 2015. More detail and other papers in the series 
will be found at: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate.asp  
 
In our first set of papers, including this, we look back at the policies of the Labour government from 1997 
to 2010, charting their approach and assessing their impact on the distribution of outcomes and on 
poverty and inequality particularly.  This provides a baseline for analysing and understanding the 
changes that are now taking place under the Coalition government. All these papers approach this by 
following a chain from ultimate policy aims, through specific policy objectives, to public spending and 
other policies, to outcomes.   This provides a device for the systematic analysis and comparison of 
activity and impact in different social policy areas.  A short supplementary paper defining the terms used 
in the framework and exploring its uses and limitations is available at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/spcc/RN001.pdf  
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Summary  
 
When he came to power in 1997, Tony Blair reacted to widening disparities between poorer and richer 
neighbourhoods by declaring that no one in future decades should be seriously disadvantaged by where 
they lived.   What policies did Labour pursue and how close did it come to realising Blair’s vision?    
 Labour introduced a new approach – a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. Minimum 
standards were set that no neighbourhood should fall below (described as “the social equivalent of 
the Minimum Wage”).  
 
 New funds were made available. The largest was the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF), 
costing about £500m per year. Poor neighbourhoods also received extra inputs through Sure Start, 
Decent Homes, Housing Market Renewal, New Deal for Communities (NDC), Excellence in Cities 
and many others.  
 
 Physical environments and services got better. 90 per cent of social housing was brought to a 
‘decent’ standard. Rates of crime, litter and vandalism fell and differences between deprived and 
other areas (“gaps”) narrowed. New childcare and health centres, schools and community buildings 
were built in the most deprived areas; neighbourhood policing and community warden schemes were 
introduced.   
 
 Gaps also improved in many individual outcomes between poorer and richer areas including 
death rates from cancer and heart disease, school attainment, and worklessness. But some gaps did 
not close, including life expectancy and neighbourhood satisfaction, and all gaps remained large.  
 
 Labour’s investments represented value for money. The NDC evaluation estimated savings at 
between three and five times the amounts invested. Evaluation of the NRF concluded that savings 
from reductions in worklessness were five times the estimated £312m spent on this issue.    
 
Labour’s neighbourhood renewal policies achieved a great deal. They reversed a trend of increasing 
disparities between areas, both in opportunities and outcomes. But Blair’s vision was not realised: which 
is, perhaps, not surprising in the context of sustained income inequalities. In 2015 we will produce an 
equivalent report on the Coalition’s record. 
 
 
A full summary of this paper is available at: 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate/Programme_Reports_an
d_event_information.asp 
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Introduction   
Since 2010 there have been dramatic changes to the approach of central government in England to the 
‘regeneration’ or ‘renewal’ of deprived neighbourhoods.  In moves that reflect not only deficit reduction 
policies, but the government’s desire to reduce the size of the central state and give greater power and 
responsibility to local communities, all of the major funding streams supporting regeneration in 2010 
have since been discontinued, along with many of the institutions and mechanisms established by 
Labour: area agreements between central and local government, regional spatial strategies, 
Government Offices for the regions and Regional Development Agencies.   Instead, the new government 
has focused much more on stimulating growth to enable regeneration, with central government in a 
“strategic and supportive role” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2011, no page 
number). Mechanisms include the Regional Growth Fund, New Homes Bonus, reforms of the planning 
system and investments in infrastructure projects such as the high speed rail network, Crossrail and the 
Olympic legacy.  The goal is that “local economies prosper, parts of the country previously over-reliant 
on public funding see a resurgence in private sector enterprise and employment, and that everyone gets 
to share in the resulting growth” (ibid, no page number).  At the same time, local regeneration activity is 
seen as “driving economic growth and helping local leaders to strengthen their communities and support 
people back into work” (ibid, no page number).  To enable this, the government is removing ringfencing 
of local government budgets, enabling local pooling of budgets, and encouraging the co-production of 
services by community and voluntary organisations as part of the ‘Big Society’.   The approach of the 
English government contrasts with the situation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, where central 
government commitments to neighbourhood renewal programmes have been reaffirmed.   
 
The impact of these policy changes, in combination with the effects of recession and muted recovery, is 
one of the key topics investigated by the Social Policy in a Cold Climate research programme.  In 
addition to tracking policy and spending changes, we are analysing neighbourhood-level changes in 
poverty and deprivation before and after the Coalition took office, using a variety of area typologies and 
metrics.   In this paper we put this in context by looking back at the period 1997-2010.  To enable a 
detailed comparison with what is happening now, we set out the previous government’s policy approach, 
and assess its results.  How did Labour approach deprived neighbourhoods, and what did it achieve?  
What legacy did it leave for the Coalition to inherit? A full comparison of all four constituent countries of 
the UK is beyond the scope of a single paper. This paper therefore focuses on England, which has 
experienced the most substantial policy shifts over the period in question as well as being the UK’s 
largest country.  A companion paper (Lupton, forthcoming) provides a full comparative analysis of policy 
developments in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.  
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Policy Goals 
As Glennerster and Hills (1998) note, some areas of social policy, such as health, are characterised by 
long-term consistency in their overall goals while in others, such as education, the fundamental purposes 
of policy intervention, not just the content of the policies themselves, are often politically contested at any 
one time and also seem to undergo periodic shifts of political consensus.   Neighbourhood renewal 
certainly comes into the latter category.  Labour’s election in 1997 brought about a steep-change in 
policy from that of the previous Conservative administration, and substantial changes were also evident 
over the Labour period.   We suggest that three distinct periods can be identified: the ‘neighbourhood 
renewal years’ (1997-2003/4), the ‘transition years’ (2004/5 to 2007) and the ‘transformation years’ (from 
2007/8 onwards). 
 
The early years of the Blair government saw neighbourhood renewal given high political priority, backed 
by extensive new activity and funding.     The impact of de-industrialisation, suburbanisation, social and 
technological change and the shrinking value (relative to wages) of welfare benefits on the poorest 
communities had become increasingly evident during the late 1980s and 1990s (Davies 1998; A. Power 
& Mumford 1999; Lupton 2003). This resulted, under the Conservatives, in the initiation first of City 
Challenge (in 1991/2) and then of the larger Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund (SRB) in 1994, 
both programmes run by the then Department of the Environment.   SRB was in itself a more 
comprehensive approach than previously adopted.  It rolled up a number of other grants and 
programmes such as the remnants of the Urban Programme and Estate Action into a single fund 
allocated to local partnerships by competitive bidding, either for themed or holistic area regeneration.  It 
was a relatively large programme, with over 1000 schemes funded in six annual rounds starting in 
1995/6, but it was flexible and local.  Because of the competitive nature of the fund, the distribution of 
funding depended on capacity for project design and bidding as well as deprivation.  The scale, duration 
and content of schemes were determined by the local partnerships and government took a hands-off 
approach to management (Rhodes et al. 2007).   
  
Shaw & Robinson (2009) argue that City Challenge and SRB marked a significant shift away from the 
property-led regeneration of the late 1980s to community-centred and partnership-based approaches 
and in this sense ‘provided the foundations’ (p125) for Labour’s approach.  However, with Labour’s 
election in 1997, the problems of deprived areas were positioned as a matter of much higher political 
priority, with responsibility moved to the centre of government, and with a much more wide-ranging 
approach.   Memorably, Blair highlighted the issue in his very first speech as Prime Minister at the 
troubled Aylesbury Estate in Southwark.  Disparities between neighbourhoods were placed at the centre 
of the new social exclusion agenda, so much so that the first task of the new Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) 
that Blair launched at the Aylesbury Estate was to report on the problems of deprived neighbourhoods.  
From this followed the establishment of eighteen Policy Action Teams (PATS)–energetic collaborations 
between civil servants, academics, community leaders and local professionals to identify the problems 
and work out how they could be solved.  The involvement of Whitehall outsiders was a feature of 
Labour’s early policy making (Eisenstadt 2011), bringing a greater connection to problems on the ground 
and an energy and commitment for change.  The SEU and the PATS were seemingly able to craft a new 
consensus around what needed to be done, and persuade government to back it with increased 
spending and new ways of working.  Their work led to a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal 
(NSNR), launched with the aim that within 10 to 20 years no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by 
where they live (SEU 2001).  Houghton (2010) has observed that this was one of the few explicit pledges 
made by the New Labour government in relation to inequality.    
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Whether this goal – that neighbourhood disparities should be reduced so much as to eliminate any 
significant problems (for individuals) arising from them – was ever intended to be narrowly interpreted 
and enacted is debatable.  As the NSNR Action Plan (SEU 2001) acknowledged, some places will 
always be poorer than others (p24) and could therefore be expected to confer more disadvantages. The 
actual impact of these neighbourhood differentials on individual outcomes (i.e.  the existence of 
‘neighbourhood effects’ that can make individual disadvantages worse), is disputed.    Certainly no target 
could be set in relation to reducing ‘neighbourhood effects’, given the patchy nature of the research 
evidence on neighbourhood effects (van Ham et al. 2012).  Arguably then, the statement that “no-one 
should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live” should be read in a broader way, as a signal of 
commitment to making a drastic improvement to the worst neighbourhoods rather than as a specific and 
measurable goal.  Indeed the vision as set out in the Action Plan makes this commitment clear.  
Although some places would continue to be poor,  cycles of decline could be stopped and prevented 
from recurring,  services should not be worse than in other areas, “all neighbourhoods in the country 
should be free of fear”, and “we should not have neighbourhoods where so many people’s number one 
priority is to move out” ( SEU 2001 p24).    
 
Despite the visionary zeal with which this was expressed, we would describe this as “an ameliorative 
logic”.  A clear rationale was set out for central government interventions at the neighbourhood scale to 
protect the residents of deprived areas from the worst consequences of economic  and social inequality 
in order to provide greater geographical equity in the distribution of services, opportunities, and 
economic and social goods (such as health,  safety of people and property, and neighbourhood 
conditions and amenities).  These neighbourhood level interventions went alongside policies of regional 
economic development although not, as various critics have pointed out, broader economic and fiscal 
policies to address growing inequalities in the economy and society as a whole (S. Power et al. 2005).  
In the light of later developments, the motivation for this approach merits scrutiny.  Policy documents 
from this time indicate that architects of neighbourhood renewal policy saw its prime rationale as social 
justice or fairness, with economic efficiency arguments also featuring, but in second place.  A big part of 
the problem was seen as the failure of central and local government: failure to tackle local economic 
problems; to promote safe and stable communities; to provide good core public services such as 
schools; to involve communities; to show leadership and work jointly; and to collect and use information 
(SEU 2001 p18).  Poor services and conditions, it was argued, made it worse to be on a low income, and 
“people on low incomes should not have to suffer conditions and services that are failing and so different 
from what the rest of the population receives” (ibid p 8).  There is evidence here of a sense of injustice 
and a demand for the rights of the least advantaged to be recognised.   In this sense we do not wholly 
agree with critics who have positioned Labour’s neighbourhood renewal policies as  arising from a social 
integrationist or moral underclass discourse that blamed people in low income neighbourhoods for their 
own situation and put responsibility onto them to reintegrate themselves into society through upskilling 
and participating in regeneration activities (Watt 2000).   
 
In support of the overall vision, two long-term goals were set.  The first was absolute: to have less 
worklessness, less crime, better health, better skills, and better housing and physical environments in all 
the poorest neighbourhoods. The second was relative: to narrow the gap on these measures between 
the most deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country.  These were supported by a set of ‘floor 
targets’ (see Tables 4, 5 and 6 and later discussion for detail) described as “the social equivalent of the 
Minimum Wage” (NRU website 1 ) ensuring that “no longer will the poorest areas and groups go 
unnoticed.”  In practice the targets included both floor and convergence goals.  
                                                        
1
 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060530091128/http://neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=585  
Accessed 9
th
 March 2012 
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Significantly, housing and environment were added to the list of goals following extensive consultation, in 
recognition of “the poor state of housing and the physical environment in many deprived areas, and the 
part it plays in social exclusion” (SEU 2001 p25) (Power, A. 2007).  The final list therefore gave rise to 
different kinds of interventions: those that were  primarily focused on places in order to facilitate 
improvement in individual outcomes (e.g. environmental and housing improvements); those that were 
focused on improving individual outcomes directly (e.g. employment advice and training); those that 
targeted individuals in order to improve places (e.g. dealing with anti-social behaviour); and those that 
were focused on people and places simultaneously and the interactions between them (e.g. multi-
faceted area regeneration programmes) (Griggs et al. 2008).  The incorporation of all these goals 
reflected the government’s recognition that individual circumstances are in part constituted by place, and 
also that individual circumstances, choices and behaviours are constitutive of place characteristics.  
People and place are linked in the concept of social exclusion.  As we shall see, a significant proportion 
of the spending ended up going towards housing, environment and amenities, although the majority of 
the targets focused on individual outcomes not on these place improvements per se, with the result that 
official measurements of success do not capture the holistic nature of the intentions and activities.  
 
The new neighbourhood renewal approach essentially continued throughout John Prescott’s terms of 
office in charge of communities and local government (until 2006) and during Ruth Kelly’s brief term in 
2006/07.  Following a review of progress by the Strategy Unit in the Cabinet Office in 2004 (Cabinet 
Office 2004), the Prime Minister still identified poor housing and environments and key public services 
performing poorly “so that deprived areas do not receive adequate support relative to their needs” (p8) 
as key issues that needed to be tackled, and reaffirmed the original vision and goals of the NSNR.  
However, towards the latter part of the period, the analysis of the problem began to shift, and with it the 
emphasis put on different policy goals.  For this reason, we describe the period from 2004-7 as ‘the 
transition years’.  
 
Two main shifts were evident.  One was that more emphasis began to be given to the importance of 
economic outcomes, with ‘worklessness’ emerging as a central term in policy documents.  As early as 
2004, the Cabinet Office review positioned ‘low levels of economic activity’ (p12) as one of the three 
main drivers of area-based deprivation – a distinct discursive shift from the “mass joblessness as the 
result of several recessions and the decline of manufacturing industry” to which the SEU (2001 p 17) had 
alluded.  Its report recommended that Regional Development Agencies should give greater priority to 
“reducing worklessness and promoting enterprise in deprived areas” (p18).  Second, and linked, 
borrowing from the US ‘concentrated poverty’ literature, there was also more focus on ‘concentrated 
deprivation’ and on the need to introduce greater social mix in order to make deprived communities 
sustainable in the long term.  Lupton & Tunstall (2008) have noted the increasing emphasis given to the 
spatial ordering of problems, not as a manifestation of structural deficiencies, but in terms which 
emphasised the spatial behaviour of people, such as ‘concentration’ and ‘clustering’, and the emergence 
of arguments that, where the poor cluster, communities necessarily fail, despite the best efforts of 
ameliorative interventions by the state.  As David Miliband put it “We know that communities with a high 
concentration of single tenure, low income residents have not worked in the past and will not work in the 
future” (quoted in Weaver 2006).  The idea that communities needed to be mixed and balanced in order 
to be sustainable also emerged from the Sustainable Communities Plan (SCP) which introduced a 
broader vision to create sustainable communities – places where people want to live – that promote 
opportunity and a better quality of life for all.” (ODPM 2004), in which the earlier focus on the most 
deprived neighbourhoods became subsumed.  Overall, while the policy goal might have remained 
notionally the same, the rationale for reducing neighbourhood disparities seemed to be shifting from 
equity to efficiency.   Rather less emphasis was being given to the long term ameliorative role of the 
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state and rather more to the need to create functioning labour and housing markets that would enable 
self-sustaining neighbourhoods, and, therefore, neighbourhoods that would not require repeated state 
intervention.  Discursively at least, the characteristics and behaviours of residents (‘worklessness’, 
‘barriers’, ‘concentration’) were gaining more prominence, as structural arguments receded.  At the same 
time, the broader discourse of social exclusion was also changing.  The rising economic tide and the 
apparent success of early policies gave rise to an increasing focus on the very worst off groups, a 
development that was also mirrored in neighbourhood renewal in discussions around sharpening 
interventions to focus on areas in danger of reaching tipping points or not being picked up by housing 
and labour market recovery (Meen et al. 2005). 
 
The advent of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister in in 2007 heralded a much more fundamental shift in 
policy goals, from social justice and amelioration to economic competitiveness and transformation.  
While Brown was still at the Treasury, he instigated a review of sub-national economic development and 
regeneration (HM Treasury. 2007) led by John Healey.  The review concluded that substantial progress 
had been made in reducing spatial disparities, but that the gaps were still too large, particularly in 
relation to worklessness.  Interventions were not always coordinated, nor at the right spatial scale, clear 
in their objectives and sufficiently well targeted.  
 
Most importantly, the review redefined regeneration and its purpose, in economic terms.  Regeneration 
was defined as the “process of reversing physical, economic and social decline in an area where market 
forces will not do this without intervention” (p14), and its purpose was first and foremost to improve 
economic efficiency.  The document stated clearly that in an efficient market, there would inevitably be 
inequalities between neighbourhoods.  However, these would normally be corrected by market 
mechanisms (such as investors moving to cheaper areas).  State intervention should be considered in 
order to correct market failures through provision of better public goods, information or coordination to 
enhance investment and enable all areas to achieve their economic potential.  Although an equity 
rationale was also mentioned, this too was framed in economic terms.  Returning all areas to market 
functionality would benefit people with “barriers to full mobility” (between areas) and who were therefore 
“most likely to suffer disproportionately from large spatial differences in economic performance”.  Absent 
from the review was any trace of the social justice rationale that had motivated the NSNR, its emphasis 
on public services or its belief in greater community ownership of decision-making.  Neighbourhood 
interventions were needed, the review concluded, but should be aimed at sustainable economic 
transformation not improving conditions per se. They should have “a stronger emphasis on tackling 
worklessness and a stronger link to wider economic interventions” (p21).  Following Brown’s move to No 
10, Healey moved to CLG, where he put the recommendations of the review into place in a new 
Regeneration Framework (CLG 2009). This set out three goals for regeneration (p5): improving 
economic performance, improving rates of work and enterprise and creating sustainable places where 
people want to live and work and businesses want to invest.  It stressed supply side problems (such as 
poor skills, lack of social networks and welfare dependency) as the cause of concentrations of 
worklessness.  In contrast to the earlier policy documents which had advocated a greater alignment of 
spending and services to need, the Regeneration Framework set out a specific ambition to reduce the 
cost to the taxpayer of “subsidising rather than transforming lives”.  This completed the shift in policy 
goals that we summarise in Table 1. 
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Table 1:Summary: Phases of Neighbourhood Renewal Policy in England 1997 - 2010 
 
 
Neighbourhood 
Renewal Years 
(1997-2003/4) 
Transition Years 
(2004/5 to 2007) 
 
Transformation 
Years 
(2007/8 to 2010) 
Dominant Analysis of 
problem 
Economic 
restructuring 
Public service failure 
Public service failure 
Market failure  
Market failure 
Dominant Logics for 
intervention 
Amelioration 
Equity 
Amelioration 
Transformation 
Equity 
Efficiency 
Transformation 
Efficiency 
Scale of intervention Neighbourhood Neighbourhood 
Local Authority 
Functional economic 
areas (e.g. cities, 
subregions) 
Functional economic 
areas (e.g. cities, 
subregions)  
Local Authority 
Neighbourhood 
 
In this series of papers, we are concentrating principally on what happened, not on why it happened. 
However, it is worth noting that these developments in policy are connected to a series of interwoven 
debates about the purpose of neighbourhood renewal type policies that have occupied academics and 
policy-makers at least since the late 1960s. Labour’s engagement with academic evidence brought 
these debates to the forefront of policy-making again in the late 1990s and 2000s.   
 
In brief, the issues here are as follows: 
 
 Whether places do in fact exert any influence on individual outcomes (so called ‘area effects). 
See Tunstall & Lupton (2010) and Cheshire (2012) for recent reviews of this evidence. 
 Whether there is any point in intervening to improve places, or undertaking place-based 
interventions that support people, if area effects are small.  A paper by Smith (1999) sets out 
various alternative rationales for such interventions such as equity and pragmatism in delivery, 
but these are less susceptible to economic evaluation (outcomes delivered for inputs made). 
 Whether, if the aim is to improve individual outcomes, programmes targeted at specific places 
are effective or efficient, given that many of the poor live outside poor areas and that those who 
benefit from place-based interventions are likely to move out (Tunstall & Lupton 2003) 
 Whether neighbourhood level interventions can have any impact on spatial inequalities in the 
light of wider economic forces.  If not, whether the role of the state should be a) to intervene at a 
macro level through economic and fiscal policies to redress wider inequalities b) to promote the 
efficient operation of housing and labour markets and enable people to move to places of greater 
opportunity or c) to ameliorate the conditions of people living in areas of market failure. 
 
Policies 
The actual policies enacted reflect the shifts in policy goals although not with a perfect correlation.  
Policies also reflect political and financial constraints, and new policies are overlaid on old resulting in a 
much muddier picture of actual activity than changes in ideology alone would suggest. 
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Neighbourhood Renewal Years 1997-2003/4 
Policy in ‘the neighbourhood renewal years’ can itself be divided into two periods.   Initial activity, while 
the PATs were at work and the National Strategy was being formulated, consisted of new programmes 
targeted at specific areas:  the New Deal for Communities (NDC), Sure Start, Employment Zones, Health 
and Education Action Zones.  NDC was Labour’s ‘flagship’ area regeneration programme – concentrated 
activity in just 39 small areas, averaging just under 10,000 residents each -  and including substantial 
investments in place and service infrastructure (schools and colleges, community buildings, health 
centres and transport), as well as programmes directed at existing residents individually.  Although 
housing was not originally part of the programme, many local partnerships quickly prioritised this issue.  
NDC was distinctive from previous area based funding schemes in its length (10 years), the scale of 
central funding (£50m per area), the establishment of community-led partnerships to design and deliver 
the programmes, and the existence of a ‘Year Zero’ for partnerships to consult and plan before spending 
any money.  Critically, the money was also allocated by central government to selected areas, rather 
than decided on the basis of a bidding competition.  However, Labour did also continue with SRB 
funding, with new annual rounds through to 2000/01.  Following the end of SRB, some funds previously 
earmarked for further rounds were channelled into a ‘single pot’ of regeneration funding run by the 
Regional Development Agencies. 
 
The second phase was marked by the introduction of the NSNR in 2001. This aimed to impact across six 
main domains: employment, education, health, housing, livability and crime, and to rely not on short term 
programmes and grants, but on directing the existing activities and spending of the welfare state (the 
‘mainstream’) towards deprived neighbourhoods.  Overall there were three main forms of intervention:  
central government interventions, local neighbourhood renewal strategies (supported by new central 
government funds) and the specific activities and programmes of the new Neighbourhood Renewal Unit.  
A crucial underpinning to all of these was investment in development of small area administrative data, a 
web-based Neighbourhood Statistics service, and the creation of the new Indices of Multiple Deprivation 
(IMD), which aimed to capture individual and place-based elements of disadvantage, enabling the 
systematic identification of ‘worst areas’ and the tracking of disparities at the small area level for the first 
time. 
 
Potentially the most influential for differences in individual social outcomes were interventions of the first 
kind: those by central government departments such as those to improve health outcomes in the poorest 
areas, target crime reduction activity or improve education and early years provision.  We do not 
describe or examine these in detail here since they are the subject of the other papers in this series.  
Examples include Excellence in Cities  and Building Schools for the Future (education), the Spearhead 
Areas (health), Sure Start programme (early years) and the Street Robbery Initiative (crime).  Other 
initiatives to target individual disadvantage such as the New Deals for the unemployed, changes to 
benefits and tax credits, the Supporting People programme and action on rough sleeping would also 
impact the poorest neighbourhoods more.  The NRU was established to have a cross-government role 
working with departments to identify, design and implement area-targeted programmes.  In accordance 
with Labour’s wider approach of setting outcome targets, ‘floor targets’ were established to hold 
government departments to account on these commitments, Neighbourhood Renewal teams were 
established in the Government Offices for the Regions to coordinate implementation.   
 
At the local level, new Local Strategic Partnerships in 91 local authorities with very deprived 
neighbourhoods were tasked with developing local renewal strategies and implementing these with 
support from a new Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF).  NRF covered districts containing 90 per cent 
of the neighbourhoods in the poorest tenth of the IMD, compared with the NDC which covered just 3 per 
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cent, showing the intention to transform government’s approach to poorer neighbourhoods in general, 
rather than to target only the very worst with short-term initiatives.  Each local authority determined its 
own strategy, the priorities given to each of NSNR domains, and the extent to which it targeted specific 
neighbourhoods or spread money more evenly. 
 
A third kind of intervention was a set of specific programmes run by the new NRU and focusing mainly 
on neighbourhood conditions and capacity building, including Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders, 
Neighbourhood Wardens, and Community Empowerment Networks.  Earlier work in CASE has reported 
on these (Power, A. 2007).  
 
In sum, NSNR was much more than a set of additional spending programmes.  It was more 
fundamentally about changing the way that central and local government approached neighbourhood 
disparities. The new floor targets reflected the redistributive intentions of the NSNR’s architects.  
According to the NRU they were “an advance in how Government tackles disadvantage” ensuring “a 
certain level of standards for all, because for the first time Government departments, local authorities 
and other service providers are being judged on their performance in the areas where they are doing 
worst, rather than on the national average”.  Through the NSNR, a new machinery was established in 
central government, the regions and localities for organising and delivering neighbourhood-level 
interventions and monitoring their outcomes.  There was an expectation that funding for services would 
need to be ‘bent’ towards poorer areas for sustained periods, if not indefinitely, partly in order to 
customise services to the needs of specific populations (for example, building capacity, providing 
specialised services for certain migrant or refugee groups). This was partly in order to meet additional 
demands and needs for ongoing public services (for example, more funding for schools in poorer 
neighbourhoods), and partly to equalise conditions and opportunities, reflecting the inability of people in 
poorer areas to pay for valued goods from private providers (for example, food co-operatives, tool banks, 
youth facilities and play areas, IT equipment and training).  Thus rather than relying on specific short-
term initiatives, the ‘mainstream’ responses of local authorities and central government departments 
would, over time, become more targeted and fitted to poorer areas.  This was a crucial change.  And 
although various critics have argued that it amounted to little in practice (Perrons & Skyers 2003; Fuller 
& Geddes 2008; Imrie & Raco 2003), there was also, in all Labour’s early programmes, a strong 
emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ regeneration, with community members being empowered to take key 
decisions (Marinetto 2003).  
 
That these reforms represented a  very substantial change in approach is not in doubt.  It is less evident 
that there was a well established theory of change, understood across government, about how exactly 
the new mechanisms would achieve the desired outcomes.  More likely this was a vision, with a 
developing programme, rather than a mature policy machine at the outset. 
    
Transition Years 2004/5 to 2007 
These policies continued during the transition years of the mid 2000s. The 2004 spending review 
reaffirmed the initial commitments to floor targets, and indeed sharpened them with the introduction of 
the IMD enabling a clearer focus on the most deprived small areas rather than electoral wards or local 
authorities.  This period also saw many of the specific grants and programmes, initiated in 2001 and run 
by central government, being rolled into new performance management and funding arrangements with 
local government - the Local Area Agreements, by which local authorities could have more discretion 
over the use of funds, provided that they met specific targets agreed with Westminster.  From 2007-08, 
NRF operated through LAAs, supported by a centrally-funded data hub for identification and monitoring.  
Programme funding for neighbourhood management, wardens and community networks were absorbed 
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into a new Safer Stronger Communities Fund (SSCF).  NRU itself was moved into a broader group 
within the department called ‘Tackling Disadvantage’ (which also included the Social Exclusion Unit and 
Housing and Homeless Support), and its spending ceased to be separately identified in departmental 
reports. 
 
On the one hand, these developments signalled a ‘new localism’ in which responsibilities for identifying 
and addressing the problems of the most deprived neighbourhoods moved more firmly to the local level.  
However the new emphasis on transforming economic outcomes and on sustainable housing markets 
also led to the adoption of new, more strategic, programmes at wider spatial scales, notably the Housing 
Market Renewal programme, which established nine sub-regional partnerships (with another three 
added later) to tackle low demand and housing abandonment, rebalancing housing markets over a 
period of 10-15 years.  The HMR projects were principally focused on demolition and housing 
refurbishment, although  they also included programmes akin to those in the NDCs – local employment 
and training initiatives and environmental improvements for example (Audit Commission 2009).  
However in sharp contrast to the NDCs, decision making was very much top-down rather than 
community-led (Cole & Nevin 2004) – a consequence of the shift to planning at a larger spatial scale.  
There were other developments too, following the Sustainable Communities Plan.  One was a new focus 
on liveability and sustainability, very much in keeping with the NSNR’s environmental emphasis.  In 2006, 
the ‘Cleaner, Safer, Greener’ strategy was announced to improve the quality of public open spaces.  
Another reflected the increasing focus on achieving long term transformation of areas by 
deconcentrating poverty.  A  new Mixed Communities demonstration scheme was initiated (although with 
no new money) to show how deprived communities could be transformed by private sector investment 
into new mixed-tenure housing. Typically such projects involved rebuilding social housing estates at 
higher densities, with the extra homes being built for sale and profits on these sales generating subsidy 
for new or refurbished social housing and community facilities  (a rather different approach to the poverty 
‘dispersal’ approach often taken in the US, where estates were rebuilt at lower density, with new private 
housing replacing social housing).  The increasing focus on worklessness was reflected in a new Local 
Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI) to boost enterprise and investment.  Urban Regeneration Companies 
(URCs) were established to handle key large scale economic and physical regeneration projects. 
 
Transformation Years 2007 - 2010 
The years from 2007 saw a further shift in responsibility to local authorities with the establishment of the 
unringfenced Area Based Grant which incorporated both SSCF, Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) 
(the successor fund to the NRF) and a large number of other area-based grants from the departments of 
health, education, transport and others.  The NRU was disbanded, as were the floor targets per se – 
although some of these remained as key indicators under a new system of Departmental Strategic 
Objectives.  One reading of these changes is that they reflect the success of the NRU in having 
routinised neighbourhood management, multi-agency working and the bending of mainstream funds and 
services towards deprived neighbourhoods.  They can also be seen as a further move towards localism 
– local authorities could now prioritise the issues they deemed most important locally.  However they are 
also consistent with the subordination of neighbourhood renewal type interventions, with a focus on 
conditions and services, to economic regeneration interventions, and with it, the move to bigger spatial 
scales for decision-making.  The new regeneration framework emphasised the importance of aligning 
housing and neighbourhood renewal spend with a strategic approach to economic regeneration.  
Regional Development Agencies and the newly formed Homes and Communities Agency (HCA)2 were 
                                                        
2
 The creation of the HCA was in itself a move to integrate economic, physical and housing regeneration and to 
enable a larger scale approach.  The new agency brought together the investment functions of the Housing 
Corporation, English Partnerships and parts of CLG in a new housing and regeneration agency. 
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to have a ‘single conversation’ with local authorities and other partners to identify regional priority areas 
for investment, and move towards a programme approach to funding in these areas, rather than funding 
projects under different housing and regeneration schemes, in different areas.  The agenda for the HMR 
programme also shifted away from ‘renewal’ towards supporting economic growth (Audit Commission 
2009; Ferrari 2007).  City-region planning was promoted, and authorities encouraged to develop Multi-
Area Agreements (MAAs) with central government.  The neighbourhood was no longer government’s 
starting point for considering neighbourhood problems and spatial inequalities or their solutions. 
 
The NRF was replaced by a new Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) more closely targeted towards 
65 local authorities selected on indicators of the proportion of people out of work and claiming benefits.  
Unlike NRF, WNF was unringfenced and could be used how local authorities saw fit to meet the 
worklessness targets agreed in their LAAs.  As with NRF, the inherent local autonomy makes it 
impossible to identify the totality of activity under the programme.  No doubt some authorities would have 
continued existing NRF-funded programmes, but given them a more employment-related emphasis as 
opposed to starting a wholly new set of activities. An early review suggested some dilution of the focus 
on area deprivation.  Most but not all LAs were still targeting particular neighbourhoods under WNF, but 
in most cases this was not exclusive – funds could be spent to get people into work wherever they lived.  
The most common use of the funds was for supply-side initiatives – helping people become more 
employable and get a job (University of Cambridge 2010).    
 
Public Spending on Neighbourhood Renewal in England 
That the expansion was accompanied by a significant increase in spending over that of the previous 
government is not in doubt.  However, the design of NSNR, with its three-pronged approach (central 
government mainstreaming, NRF and local government mainstreaming, and NRU initiatives) makes the 
sum of spending on neighbourhood renewal impossible to establish.  Data on spending on identifiable 
NRU initiatives and the NRF programmes can be culled from evaluation reports, departmental annual 
reports and local authority revenue budget data, although these different sources are inconsistent over 
time and with each other.  Moreover, these initiatives and programmes are only part of the story, and  
not all of the other work of central government departments in redistributing effort towards poorer 
neighbourhoods is identifiable.  Some of it will have spent on identifiable targeted initiatives, such as the 
Deprived Areas Fund in DWP and Excellence in Cities in education; more will have spent through a 
range of much smaller grants to local authorities, many of them later rolled up in Area-Based Grant; and 
much more through the various funding formulae by which central government allocates funding to local 
authorities on the basis of need.  Changes in the amounts spent on area-based programmes may reflect 
changes in the balance between targeted and mainstream funding rather than real changes in the 
amounts different areas are receiving.  We therefore approach the question of ‘how much was spent?’ in 
two ways -  by giving indicative data of the size of different programmes over time, and by assessing the 
extent to which central government allocations to local government, overall, became more redistributive 
to areas of deprivation.  Note that neither of these analyses count spending on the government 
machinery that was established : the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, regional infrastructure, information 
and statistics. 
 
Table 2 shows the indicative sizes of Labour’s main programmes3, and the SRB which it inherited from 
the Conservatives.  SRB was in itself a significant programme.  By adding NDC and NRF alone, Labour 
more than doubled annual expenditure from 2001/02.  Expenditure on these main programmes peaked 
around 2007.  
                                                        
3
 The smaller NRU programmes including Neighbourhood Wardens and Neighbourhood Management are not 
included here because of their small size. 
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Table 2: Size of Labour's Main Neighbourhood Renewal Programmes 
 
Programme Dates Approximate 
Annual Cost 
(£million) 
Number and Scale of 
Areas included 
SRB 1995/6 to 2006/7 520 1028 schemes ranging 
from local authority ward 
to combinations of Local 
Authorities 
NDC 1999/00 to 2009/10 200 39 neighbourhoods 
NRF/WNF 2001/02 to 2010/11 500 95 local authorities at 
peak 
HMR 2003/4 to 2010/11 275 12 subregional housing 
markets comprising 
parts of 28 local 
authorities 
Local Enterprise 
Growth Initiative 
(LEGI) 
2005/06 to 2010/11 70 30 local authorities 
 
NRF/WNF made up the largest single share of the new funding, about one third at the peak.  Housing 
Market Renewal had cost about £2.2bn by 2010/11, and NDC, targeted at just 39 small areas of up to 
10,000 people each, was the next largest programme at about £2 billion, far eclipsing the smaller NRU 
programmes on neighbourhood wardens, neighbourhood management and community capacity building 
(worth about £45m a year between them between 2001/2 and 2004/5).   
 
The broad coverage of some of these programmes meant that their value compared with overall local 
government spending, and with spending on other major public services, was small.  At its peak in 
2007/8, NRF made up less than 1% (0.8%) of the total funds distributed to local authorities by central 
government to provide services (Aggregate External Finance or AEF), and was worth on average 
between £66 and £120 per head in the neighbourhoods affected. 4   By way of contrast, central 
government health spending per head per year in England amounted to £1631 in 2007/8. 
 
Seen another way, hovever, it is evident that NRF did provide substantial new capacity for action, 
especially in smaller, extensively deprived authorities.  If, instead of looking at the overall value of the 
fund compared with other funds, we look at the allocations to individual local authorities, a different 
picture emerges.  Again looking at the peak expenditure year 2007/08, NRF allocations averaged about 
£5.7 million for London Boroughs, £9.3m for metropolitan districts, £6.1m for other unitary authorities 
and £1.7m for non-unitary district councils.  Table 3 shows that this allocation was equivalent to about 
7% of local authority spending in that year, excluding spending on education and social services.  There 
was substantial variation.  For example in Croydon, a highly populated London borough with pockets of 
extreme deprivation, NRF accounted for only 1% of expenditure, compared with  31% of expenditure in 
Easington, a small extensively deprived authority.  On this basis, one could expect the withdrawal of 
                                                        
4
  Author’s calculation based on the following assumptions: a) that all NRF monies received by local authorities 
were allocated to neighbourhood-based spending (in reality, some would have been retained for central services) 
and b) that these funds were all allocated to neighbourhoods within these local authorities which were in the most 
deprived 10% (higher figure) or 20% (lower figure) on the IMD.  On these assumptions, some authorities could 
have spent about £300-400 per head if targeting just the 10% worst neighbourhoods, and others as little as £15.  
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NRF or similar funds to have significant impact on local authority activity in deprived neighbourhoods.  
The same is certainly true for NDC funding, which was much more substantial on a per capita basis 
(£500 per resident per year for the life of the programme (Foden et al. 2010 p2)).  
 
Table 3: Average Value of NRF allocations to different types of local authorities 2007/08 
 
 Number 
receiving 
NRF 
Average 
Allocation 
£m 
NRF as % of all 
service spend 
NRF as % of all 
service spend 
except education 
and social 
services 
London Boroughs 19 5.7 1.2 5.0 
Metropolitan Districts 31 9.3 1.7 7.8 
Shire Districts 20 1.7 9.6 9.6 
Unitary Authorities 16 6.1 1.9 6.9 
All 86  3.3 7.1 
 
Sources: Authors' calculations from NRF allocation from Parliamentary Question.  Services Expenditure from 
CIPFA Finance and General Statistics, compiled from LA returns. 
Taking a broader view, it is clear that the sum of these larger programmes, other new and targeted 
initiatives and a review of the basic ‘formula grant’ to local authorities resulted in a greater share of 
central government funding going to poorer areas.  Figures 1 and 2 show the total central government 
revenue funding (per head of population) going to local authorities in 1998/99, 2001/2, 2005/6 and 
2008/9, in real terms(2008/9 prices), adjusted for economy-wide (GDP) inflation.  We take the ‘total 
central government revenue funding’ to include formula grant, Area-Based Grant and all special and 
specific grants to local authorities, with the exception of those that are provided to finance mandatory 
payments that local authorities must process on behalf of central government, such as housing benefits 
or council tax benefits.  Authorities are divided into two groups reflecting the different division of 
responsibilities : lower tier district councils;  and unitary authorities (including London Boroughs and the 
former metropolitan districts) which also have responsibility for education and social services.5   Each 
group is divided into quintile groups depending on their rank in the Indices of Multiple Deprivation most 
closely corresponding to the year for which the financial data is reported.   
 
The analysis shows, firstly, that more funding in 1998/9 was already distributed to the poorer LAs.  On 
average, the most deprived fifth of unitary authorities received an extra 68% per head and districts an 
extra 62% per head.  This gap widened slightly.   For the unitary authorities, London Boroughs and 
Metropolitan Districts, the change was relatively small: a shift to a ratio of 1.73:1 by the end of the 
period.  The second quintile group also pulled away slightly.  For districts the trend was more 
pronounced, with the most deprived fifth of  authorities pulling away markedly from the rest, ending with 
an extra 83% funding (or £65 per head) over the least deprived authorities, compared with 62% (£40 per 
head) at the start.   In both cases, although real terms funding continued to increase throughout the 
period, the closing of the gap happened almost entirely up until 2005/6 (in our data), with little further 
redistribution in the last period. 
 
                                                        
5
 This analysis does not include County Councils because it is district councils which have responsibility for 
neighbourhood renewal.  
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Figure 1: Central Government Revenue Funding per Head: District Councils 1998/9 to 2008/9 
 
 
Figure 2: Central Government Revenue Funding per Head: Unitary Authorities and London 
Boroughs 1998/9 to 2008/9  
 
Sources for Fig. 1and 2  
 LA financial data: DCLG Revenue Accounts; 
 Deprivation Measure: ONS Indices of Deprivation Local Authority Summaries  
 Population Estimates for Per Capita Figures: ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates, all persons. 
For further detail see research note at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case/_new/research/Social_Policy_in_a_Cold_Climate/Programme_Reports_and_e
vent_information.asp 
 
Inputs and Outputs  
What did this money buy, in terms of capital projects, extra staff, goods and services (inputs), and what 
was produced or delivered as a result (outputs)?  This is perhaps a particularly important question in 
relation to neighbourhood renewal.  Typically in analyses of the welfare state we would regard these 
inputs and outputs as the means to better individual outcomes.  However, given the early policy goals of 
improving services, amenities and conditions in poor areas in the name of social justice, these inputs 
(neighbourhood wardens, for example) and outputs (better homes and environments, for example) might 
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also be considered ends in themselves. Nevertheless, the same complexity of delivery that makes it 
hard to identify spending also inhibits comprehensive counting of inputs and outputs  Again we construct 
a broad picture using a variety of sources including programme evaluations and data on trends in 
neighbourhood housing, environment and services. 
 
Substantial evaluation reports on NRF and NDC describe what was done under these programmes, 
although they do not provide any comprehensive count of additional inputs and outputs.   In the end, 
NDC became largely a programme based around physical transformation of areas, and community 
capacity building.  Housing and physical environment projects accounted for the largest share of NDC 
spending (32 per cent), followed by community (18%) and education (17%).  Spending on immediate 
economic outcomes (getting people into work) and health made up a relatively small share (12% and 
11% respectively), with crime reduction at 10% (Batty et al. 2010).  Cowen & Wilton (2008) and Amion 
Consulting (2010) concurred that about a third of NRF money went on housing, environment and 
community safety initiatives, 18-20% on education (including pupil and teacher support and volunteer 
involvement), 15-16% on health (including advice, referrals and access to services), 11-13% on 
worklessness (including information and advice, training and work placements) and the rest on cross 
cutting activities including community capacity building. Our own review of reports from local authorities 
selected to represent a range of high, medium and low NRF recipients reveals some examples:  in South 
Tyneside a ‘Supporting People into Work’ programme helping 1257 people into jobs from 2004 to 2006 
at a cost per job of £1605 and an anti-poverty programme which helped people claim benefit 
entitlements and save on debt repayments by establishing a credit union; in Hastings the provision of 
Street Wardens and the establishment of a dedicated community policing team; in Kensington and 
Chelsea environmental improvements, an alcohol referral service,  a community literacy coordinator, a 
burglary reduction project, establishing some small business units, and provision of IT equipment for the 
voluntary sector (Audit Commission 2007; Kensington and Chelsea Partnership Steering Group 2007; 
Clive Jacotine and Associates Limited and Nick Wates Associates 2004; Special Interest Group of 
Municipal Authorities 2007). 
 
NRF funds were used to supplement existing mainstream activities and develop new programmes and 
ways of working.  The evaluation found that NRF money had been largely effective in giving local 
authorities and partners increased flexibility to spend and experiment across thematic areas, increasing 
the visibility of neighbourhood renewal as a priority for service providers, and encouraging mainstream 
agencies to be more attentive to need in the poorest areas and more assiduous in ensuring that the 
services they provided were of equivalent quality.  According to the evaluation, two-thirds of the outputs 
and outcomes from NRF would not have occurred without the programme.  By way of example, in 
Birmingham, NRF was used to fund police overtime, neighbourhood policing and extra police to 
undertake specific operations addressing floor targets.  It also funded a pilot free swimming scheme 
under the ‘health and well-being’ theme, later taken on by the local authority.  One survey of local 
authorities found a case of 60% of NRF funds being spent on mainstream activities, although this was 
unusually high.  Some authorities also used NRF to establish greater participatory budgeting and local 
decision-making. For example, Kirklees established a ‘People’s Purse’ - funds ring-fenced for community 
and voluntary groups working or based in the Neighbourhood Renewal target areas, and Birmingham 
established a system of ‘ward allocations’ to direct funding to smaller projects such as playgrounds, play 
schemes and outreach youth work which attracted less mainstream money. Hastings developed local 
action plans (LAPs), allowing for the customisation of local services – for example establishing street 
cleansing levels.   
 
This evidence suggests a wide range of new and extended services, varying locally, provided as a result 
of the NRF elements of NSNR.  In addition, other central government programmes delivered more or 
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improved services and infrastructure.  A key initiative was the Decent Homes (DH) programme, through 
which the government pledged to bring all social housing to a decent standard by 2010, with more than 
half the improvements being made in the most deprived 117 local authorities.  DH got off to a slower 
start than hoped but over 90% of social housing had been brought up to standard by 2010.  There has 
been no final report on the proportion in deprived local authorities, but given the correlation between 
social housing and poverty, there is no doubt that this programme made a difference to conditions in 
many of the poorest neighbourhoods.6  Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders and mixed community 
initiatives also refurbished thousands of homes and built new homes, none of which were directly 
reported on as part of the floor target regime.  
 
In combination, Decent Homes, HMR and other public/private housing regeneration schemes 
contributed to a reduction in vacant homes – one of the key problems affecting liveability and 
contributing to a spiral of decline.  There is no published analysis of the reduction in vacancies at 
neighbourhood level.  The Audit Commission’s report on the HMR programme (Audit Commission 2009) 
shows only a modest decrease in vacant homes nationally (falling from 3.4% of the stock in 2002 to 3% 
in 2008), although with bigger reductions in the northern regions which had higher vacancy rates to start 
with.   It also shows a big reduction in reported ‘low demand’ for housing, with this problem typically 
more than halving in the same period.  Our own estimates, at a finer spatial scale, suggest that there 
were about just under 6000 output areas in England with a high rate of vacant properties in 20017.  Very 
few of these were in the South of England, outside London, with the exception of some unpopular private 
housing in coastal towns.  Very unpopular housing neighbourhoods in London were almost all Inner 
London estates.  There was a lot of unpopular social housing in the large cities of the North and West.  
Overall, vacancy rates had fallen in these areas by 2007/8, and the trend was sharper in very unpopular 
estates than in mixed housing, consistent with the effect of demolition programmes.8  Not all of this can 
be attributed to policy.  Greater demand for social housing in a context of falling stock turnover, and 
reversal of population and economic decline in some less advantaged cities would also have played a 
part.  The result nevertheless, would have been an improvement in living conditions and neighbourhood 
viability in many deprived areas. 
 
Other major programmes included the expansion of childcare services and facilities and, towards the 
end of the latter part of the period, investment in new school buildings. Between 1999 and 2003, 524 
local Sure Start programmes were set up in areas with very high concentrations of children in poverty, 
providing (typically) good quality play, learning and childcare, family support, outreach and home visiting 
and health care and advice.  107 areas, two thirds of them in the 20% most deprived,  had new Early 
Excellence Centres, and 45,000 new day care places were provided in 1400 Neighbourhood Nursery 
settings in the most deprived 20% of neighbourhoods between 2001 and 2004.  In 2004, these initiatives 
were brought together in the roll out of Sure Start Children’s Centres, over 3500 in all by the end of 
Labour’s term in office.   Deprived local authorities were also the main beneficiaries of the Building 
Schools for the Future programme, announced in 2004 and intended to be a 15 wave programme 
resulting in the entire secondary school building stock being refurbished by 2020.  The programme was 
targeted by deprivation.   
                                                        
6
 The DH programme was initially monitored using two sources: landlord returns and survey data from the English 
House Condition Survey (later EHS).  EHCS was chosen as the preferred source.  The two data sources do not 
tally, and neither gives an up to date analysis by local authority or neighbourhood deprivation.  Assuming 50% (the 
target) of improvements in deprived authorities, estimates of the reduction in non-decent homes in such authorities 
would be between quarter and half a million by 2009.  
7
 Output areas (OAs) have between 40 and 125 households.   
8
 These data are from landlord returns, and coverage is incomplete, so we can only estimate trends in different 
kinds of areas, not actual numbers of vacant homes. 
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At the same time, other increases in public spending almost certainly brought extra staff into poorer 
neighbourhoods, additionally to those funded through NRF.  For example, the total (FTE) of police 
constables, special constables and police community support officers (PCSOs) rose by 22% between 
1997 and 2010, including a 13% increase in the number of constables and the introduction of the PCSO 
scheme which had created nearly 17000 additional posts by 2010.9 
 
Given that different programmes affected different but overlapping sets of neighbourhoods at different 
times, it is impossible to  quantify the overall expansion in services.  There is also little evidence on the 
efficiency of spend or value for money, except in relation to the NDC programme, where the  evaluation 
also assessed the programme’s value for money using two different methods, finding that savings could 
be estimated at between three and five times programme spend.   However, the net effect has been 
widely reported in surveys, evaluations and case studies.  The NSNR evaluation reports that many 
residents considered that the streets were cleaner, that the quality of parks and open spaces had 
improved and that environmental conditions were better (Amion Consulting 2010). The NDC evaluation 
reported statistically significant evidence of greater improvement than in comparable areas on indicators 
of place – such as perceptions of the environment, being a victim of crime, and satisfaction with the 
area. 18% of people surveyed said that the area had got much or slightly better in the last two years 
(2006-8), compared with 11% in comparator areas, which would have also been receiving additional 
investments in this period (Batty et al. 2010).    The Sure Start evaluation reported reductions in burglary, 
vehicle crime and exclusions from school,  and increases in creche and day care provision (Eisenstadt 
2011).  Other qualitative studies of low income neighbourhoods have also reported residents’ saying that 
regeneration programmes had resulted in positive improvements, although they also point to the 
diversity of views between and within neighbourhoods, and the different views that could be held by the 
same people.  Rapid change, perceptions of community decline, and processes of regeneration 
themselves could make people feel less confident and satisfied, while they simultaneously welcomed 
new services and environmental improvements (Bashir & Flint 2010; A. Power et al. 2011) 
 
Such measurements as there are also indicate improvements in neighbourhood quality.  Despite the 
early policy emphasis on neighbourhood conditions, floor targets in this area were weakly specified.  The 
government’s initial targets set in 2000 covered crime, but only at the level of the local authority (Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and Street Crime Initiative areas).  Reporting of these data by the 
Home Office was inconsistent (Civitas 2005) and the specific targets to close gaps were dropped in CSR 
2007.  Neighbourhood conditions themselves had no targets until the 2004 Spending Review, when a 
very specific set were introduced in relation to litter, abandoned cares, environmental quality and 
‘liveability’ as reported in surveys.  These were only reported upon until 2007, when they were replaced 
by a general indicator (but no specific target) on ‘satisfaction with the local area’.  Between 2004 and 
2007 there were absolute improvements in the liveability indicators and the gaps between deprived 
areas and others closed (Table 4).  On one issue (abandoned cars) there was a huge improvement, 
although this cannot be readily ascribed to policy intervention.  A contemporaneous rise in the value of 
scrap metal provided an incentive for people to trade rather than abandon their unwanted cars, bikes 
and vans.    
 
For a longer run overview, and at the neighbourhood level, we look at data on domestic burglary, an 
NSNR priority, and reported neighbourhood problems using survey data as well as police recorded crime 
data. 
  
                                                        
9
 Police Service Strength England and Wales 31 March 2011, 31st March 2008, Table 3. 
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Figure 3 compares the rate of burglary per 1,000 households in deprived areas to that for all areas. We 
look both at recorded burglary (crimes that are notified to the police) and at reported victimhood from the 
British Crime Survey (BCS) (which will include crimes that are not notified to the police).  Recorded crime 
data are at district level, and we identify the districts selected to receive NRF funding, compared with all 
districts.  Not all neighbourhoods in all these districts will have received any specific neighbourhood 
renewal interventions on crime reduction.  The BCS data is coded to the IMD 2004, using quintile 
groups.  We therefore define ‘most deprived neighbourhoods’ as those in the 20% most deprived 
neighbourhoods according to IMD 2004.  82% of these were in NRF districts.  3% were in NDC areas.  
The black line shows the number of domestic burglaries per ten thousand households in deprived areas, 
as recorded by the British Crime Survey. This fell by almost half, from 80 in 2001 to 46 in 2009. 
However, rates of acquisitive crime, including burglary, also fell sharply across Britain as a whole in the 
2000s. A better measure of the disadvantage imposed by living in poor neighbourhoods is the 'relative 
risk' of victimhood: the increase in the probability that a household in a poor neighbourhood will be 
subject to burglary, relative to a household living elsewhere. Both the recorded crime statistics and the 
BCS findings confirm that in the poorest neighbourhoods, the relative risk of burglary fell. Most of the 
closing of the gap occurred in the early 2000s, but was largely maintained later in the decade 
 
Figure 3: Domestic Burglary Rates 
 
Source: BCS from Table 7.01; Recorded crime, calculations from ONS Recorded crime; DCLG household 
projections 
Other neighbourhood problems also appeared to decrease.  Figure 4 draws on data from the Survey of 
English Housing/English Housing Survey to show the excess in those reporting specific problems in the 
neighbourhood - crime, litter and vandalism - as ‘serious’ problems in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods, compared with all neighbourhoods. The SEH/EHS data is coded to the 2007 IMD – so 
the analysis here looks at the gap between neighbourhoods in the most deprived 10% on that Index, 
which was based mainly on data collected in 2005. 88% were also in the worst 10% on the 2004 Index 
(based mainly on 2001 data), but some were no 88% of them were contained in NRF districts, and only 
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5% in NDC areas.10  These indicators also show a closing of the gap on crime, although this is only 
marginally significant and not capable of analysis over the whole period as the question changed from 
2008.  However there is a larger closing of the gap – about 5%, or a quarter of the disparity, for 
vandalism and litter.  This improvement appears to have been sustained up until 2009/10.   
Figure 4: Percentage Point Gap between People in Most Deprived Neighbourhoods and All 
Neighbourhoods Perceiving Particular Issues to be Serious Problems in their Area 
 
 
Source: Survey of English Housing/English Housing Survey 
These data seem to suggest that gaps in neighbourhood conditions between the poorest 
neighbourhoods and others did narrow, although there were still substantial differences at the end of the 
period – nearly 20 percentage points on self-report domestic burglary victimisation, 15 for litter and more 
than 10 for vandalism.  Moreover, the improvements seemed to continue even after the change in policy 
in 2007.  This may suggest a weak link between policy and outcome.  Domestic burglary rates, for 
example, may be linked to the economic cycle or to wider government policies not spatially targeted, 
such as New Deals for the unemployed or  methadone prescription for heroin addicts (Parker et al. 
1996). Alternatively it may suggest that sustainable improvements had been made either through capital 
investments in target-hardening, or through the mainstreaming of neighbourhood policing and 
management, such that crime and neighbourhood problems did not rise as might be expected during the 
recession from 2008 onwards. 
 
Individual Social and Economic Outcomes 
Lastly we turn to the impact of policies and spending on individual socio-economic outcomes for those 
living in deprived areas.  Did outcomes improve, and did gaps close between these areas and others.  
As with ‘liveability’, reporting on the government’s own floor targets gives only a partial account.  
Different departments targeted different sets of ‘worst areas’ and the lack of small area data until later in 
the 2000s meant that early targets were often set only at the local authority level. Targets also changed 
                                                        
10
 Thus the ‘most deprived neighbourhoods’ identified here are not an exact fit with the ‘most deprived 
neighbourhoods’ at the start of the period – some of them would have already improved slightly – nor an exact fit 
with the areas targeted by policy.  They are a more closely defined set of neighbourhoods than the ‘20% most 
deprived’ used by BCS.  
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with each Spending Review.  In many cases, new baselines were set or new groups of ‘worst areas’ 
selected, while monitoring of previous time series was discontinued.  A full time series is not possible. 
Departments reported on these Labour targets for the last time in 2009, often using data from 2008 so 
the record ends before the onset of recession.  We therefore supplement these with our own analysis of 
two key indicators:  neighbourhood satisfaction (as a measure of whether poor neighbourhoods were 
perceived to be less disadvantageous over time) and worklessness (the main focus of policy after 2007). 
Using publicly available data, we are able to construct a longer time series at the neighbourhood level in 
order to monitor change through the period from 2001-2010.   
      
Health and Education 
Looking first at the government’s own targets, we examine health (Table 5) and education (Table 6).  
These targets set were at local authority and school level, not neighbourhood.  They indicate progress 
on some indicators, but not on others.  To 2009, the life expectancy gap between areas widened, while 
those on cancer and circulatory diseases narrowed.  There were dramatic reductions in numbers of 
schools below the performance thresholds set by government, although  the target numbers of schools 
below these thresholds were not met.  No progress was made on inequalities at the Foundation Stage 
by 2008, the date of the government’s last report on this issue.  However there was a rapid improvement 
thereafter, so that the target was met by 2010.  
 
Assessing the impact of neighbourhood-level interventions on these trends is difficult.  In health 
particularly, demographic, economic and social (lifestyle) changes are principal drivers of health 
outcomes.  In both domains, mainstream policies, such as the national curriculum strategies, would have 
been a major part of the story.  Parallel papers on health and education look more closely at mainstream 
policies, spending, inputs and outputs to tackle inequalities in these areas.  In relation to neighbourhood 
programmes, two key health indicators, low birth weights and standardised mortality ratios, were among 
only three indicators on which local authorities in receipt of NRF saw no absolute improvement between 
2001 and 2007.   
 
In contrast, education was the domain which NRF local authorities saw the biggest absolute and relative 
improvements.  The gap in GCSE attainment at 5A*-C  between LAs in receipt of NRF and the England 
figure reduced by 71%, Key Stage 2 attainment by 41% and  Key Stage English by 32%.  However, 
schools in these local authorities would have been the prime beneficiaries from wider education policies 
geared towards raising standards and reducing inequalities. The evaluation concludes that these 
interventions are more likely to account for change than NRF itself.  The NDC evaluation showed that 
comparator areas – other poor neighbourhoods that would have benefited from national and NRF-
initiated education interventions although not NDC - actually fared better on educational attainment at 
Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 4 than the NDC areas themselves.  Indeed it found an inverse relationship 
between NDC education spend and education outcomes, suggesting that the money was possibly spent 
in the wrong way. 
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Table 5: Floor Targets, Health 
 
 
 
Table 6: Floor Targets, Education 
 
  
Target for 2010 Comparison Baseline year Baseline position 2010 Assessment
Gap: Males 2.57 % 
(1.92 years)
Gap: Males 2.61 % (2.05 
years)  Increase of 7%
Gap: Females 
1.77% (1.41 years)
Gap: Females 2% (1.65 
years) Increase of 13%
Reduce the gap in deaths 
from circulatory diseases 
by 40% 
Worst fifth of areas and 
the England average
1995-1997
Gap: 36.37 deaths 
per 100,000
Gap: 20.11 deaths per 
100,000, decrease of 45%
Target met early
Reduce the gap in life 
expectancy by 10% 
Worst fifth of areas and 
the England average 
1995-1997 Gap widened
Reduce the gap in 
premature cancer deaths 
by 6% 
Worst fifth of areas and 
the England average
1995-1997
Gap: 20.7 deaths 
per 100,000
Gap: 18.33 deaths per 
100,000, decrease of 12%
Target met early
Target Comparison Baseline year Baseline position Progress Assessment
Reduce inequalities in levels 
of development at the 
Foundation Stage
30% most disadvantaged 
areas  
2005 Gap 16% 2010: 12% Target met 
2006/07:
2,849 schools below 
target in English
1,484 below target in 
English (-48%)
3,570 schools below 
target in Maths
2,026 below target in Maths 
(-40%)
In all schools at least 50% of 
pupils to achieve Level 5 or 
2002/3
589 schools below 
target
Target was to be reached 
by 2008. By 2007 (last age 
Target not met by 
2007 
71 schools below 
2004 target
2006/07:
186 schools below 
2006 target
17 schools below 2006 
target
343 schools below 
2008 target
64 schools below 2008 
target
Reduce by 40% the 
proportion of schools in which 
fewer than 65% of pupils 
achieve level 4 or above at 
Key Stage 2
2002/3 Target met
In all schools, at least 20% of 
pupils to achieve 5 GCSEs at 
A*-C, rising to 25% by 2006 
and 30% in 2008
2003/04
Target not met by 
2007. No further 
report. Publicly 
available data shows 
that by 2010, 1 
school was below 
target
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Neighbourhood Satisfaction 
Neighbourhood satisfaction might be taken as another indicator, albeit a more subjective one, of whether 
deprived areas were improving relative to others.  Figure 5, using SEH/EHS data, shows the percentage 
of respondents who said that they were ‘slightly’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied, in response to the question “How 
satisfied are you with this area as a place to live?”.11 12  Such attitudes are known to be derived from 
perceptions of safety, community spirit, the quality of local services, amongst others, as well as being 
influenced by dwelling condition and neighbourhood composition.  In other words they appear to be 
driven by exactly the kinds of things that the government was trying to influence through the NSNR.  
Note that for SEH/EHS, the yearly percentages of respondents who perceive problems in poor 
neighbourhoods have 95% confidence intervals of around ±2%.  So, small changes need to persist for 
several years for one to attribute them with confidence to real change; differences of one or two per cent 
between single years are not significant.  The graph shows that from 1999 up until 2007 there was a 
small, but steady and statistically significant decrease in the gap between the poorest and the rest, 
although not as great as those for burglary, vandalism and litter. The gap in the early years, before 
NSNR had been launched, was around 16%; in 2006/2007, after NRF and NDC had been in effect for 
five or more years, it had fallen to around 12%.  This corroborates the picture of improvements 
suggested by the short-lived liveability indicators.  However, the disparity in dissatisfaction re-opened in 
the final two years of Labour (measured by EHS, though in the same form as in SEH).  Simply 
comparing the end to the start, there was no significant closing of the gap in neighbourhood satisfaction. 
 
Figure 5: Proportion of People Dissatisfied with Their Neighbourhood as a Place to Live 
 
 
Source: Survey of English Housing/English Housing Survey 
                                                        
11
 There are some slight changes in measurement between the Survey of English Housing (SEH), which ran until 
2008, and the English Housing Survey (EHS), which covers the final two years of New Labour, 2008/09 and 
2009/10.  The question about general neighbourhood satisfaction was asked in the same form “How satisfied are 
you with this area as a place to live?” in both surveys, and was asked before prompts about specific problems. In 
EHS, the question was asked directly after questions about tenure and accommodation satisfaction. The phrasing 
of prompts about specific neighbourhood problems varied between the two surveys, however (e.g. 'crime' versus 
'the general level of crime in the area') 
12
 The same broad pattern emerges if only those who are ‘very’ dissatisfied are included. 
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This increase in the size of the gap in the latter part of the period is somewhat surprising, given that 
neighbourhood satisfaction tends to be closely linked to crime and neighbourhood conditions (Parkes et 
al. 2002; Baum et al. 2010; Permentier et al. 2011), which showed continued improvement.   It does not 
appear to be driven by changes in the individual economic circumstances of the people living in the 
poorest neighbourhoods.  Low-income households and renters consistently rate their neighbourhood 
less well than others.  However, even when we control for changes in poverty and tenure in poor 
neighbourhoods over time, the same pattern appears.   It may be linked to the change in policy after 
2007 - the withdrawal of NRF and the reduced visibility of neighbourhood policies and programmes.  
When we look not just at the poorest neighbourhoods but at all neighbourhoods within local authoroity 
districts that received any NRF (i.e poorer local authorities), we see the same steady closing of the gap 
up until 2007, then from then a slight widening between poorer and better-off authorities. Importantly, 
however, looking at this wider set of neighbourhoods, the gap at the end of the Labour period was 
significantly smaller than at the start.  So gaps between poorer local authorities and others did narrow 
over the period as a whole, while gaps between poorest (more local) neighbourhoods and others 
narrowed but then widened again. 
 
The two sets of data together suggest that the urban authorities receiving NRF possibly improved during 
the whole period as a result of stronger economic performance and wider urban policy interventions – 
the ‘urban renaissance’ that was also a feature of early Labour policy – but that the poorest 
neighbourhoods within them only improved relative to other neighbourhoods during the period up to 
2007 when neighbourhood renewal policy created a focus on conditions and the quality of services.  
Certainly the NDC evaluation seems to show that concentrated spending and activity does lead to 
increases in satisfaction. In the NDC areas, there was an increase of 13% in those saying they were 
very or fairly satisfied with the area compared with 8% in comparator areas.  On the other hand, other 
factors altogether may drive neighbourhood satisfaction - increasing inequality or economic insecurity or 
housing inaffordability, perhaps.  Rising expectations can also depress satisfaction (James 2007).  
Whatever the reason, it would appear that overall, despite early progress, the gap in satisfaction 
between people in the most deprived neighbourhoods and others was not significantly smaller when 
Labour left office than when it entered it.  
 
Worklessness 
To assess changes in worklessness, we need to employ benefits data.  Here we follow the method of 
English Indices of Multiple Deprivation in using the total of Job Seekers Allowance and Incapacity 
Benefit/Serious Disablement Allowance claimants (and, latterly, also Employment Support Allowance), 
divided by the working-age population, as a proxy for ‘work deprivation’13.   
 
Figure 6 shows that for all high-worklessness neighbourhoods in England, shown by the solid line, there 
was a steady downward trend in the gap in the work deprivation rate from 2000 to 2009.  This partly 
reflects the absorption of marginal labour in poor neighbourhoods during a period of economic 
expansion. We see that the gap between all poor neighbourhoods and the rest widened again following 
                                                        
13
 It should be noted that the use of IB claims as an unemployment indicator is contentious, and is more so at the 
end of the decade than at the beginning. In the 1990s, large numbers of older male workers, especially in areas of 
industrial decline, were diverted from unemployment to sickness benefits. Subsequent estimates of ‘real’ local rates 
of unemployment have made use of IB data (Beatty & Fothergill 2005). However, by the end of the 2000s, much of 
the cohort diverted onto IB in 1990s had either reached retirement or died, and there is evidence that IB now 
serves the ‘correct’ client group (Gaffney 2011). Hence, to use IB without adjustment within measures of 
unemployment is both an empirical mistake and contributes to misrepresentations of how the scheme is used. 
However there is no simple way to adjust for this, so we follow the IMD’s practice. 
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the recession; the same marginal and casualised labour in poor neighbourhoods was more likely to be 
laid off.  However, the gap was still 2.7 percentage points smaller when Labour left office in May 2010 
than it was at the start of our series.  
 
This trend meant that the government met its floor target.  Set  for the first time for small areas in 2004, 
this was to reduce the gap in employment for the 903 wards with the worst labour market position in 
Spring 2005 by just one per cent by 2008.  This was exceeded (a 1.8% percentage point reduction) by 
the end of 2007.  
 
Figure 6:   Workless Rates for Highest Worklessness Neighbourhoods Compared with Others 
 
Sources: DWP Working-age client group for small areas (DWP/NOMIS). Mid-year population estimates for LSOAs, England and 
Wales (ONS) 
 
Figure 7 examines these trends more closely, looking at gaps between high worklessness 
neighbourhoods in different contexts in England (London, other large English cities and other areas).  
Workless rates fell much faster in high-workless neighbourhoods in London and other major cities than 
they did in other types of place (smaller cities, towns and coastal and rural areas).  
 
Table 7 draws this picture out further by showing changes in the two components of workless rates:  the 
number of workless people, and the total number of working-age adults that comprises the bottom half of 
the fraction.  In London and other large cities in England, there was a slight rise in the count of workless 
people, but a very rapid increase in the total working-age population.  This reflects the intensity of 
housing development and demographic change in deprived inner-city areas.  In other deprived areas, 
the count of workless people rose more, but the working age population rose less, explaining the smaller 
reduction in workless rate.  
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Figure 7: Gap in neighbourhood workless rate, relative to all English non-poor neighbourhoods 
 
Values are calculated quarterly as a four-quarter moving average. 
Sources: DWP Working-age client group for small areas (DWP/NOMIS). Mid-year population estimates for LSOAs, (ONS);  
 
Table 7: Changes in Workless Counts and Working Age Population for High Worklessness 
Neighbourhoods (top 10%) by Country and Area type 
 
 
Change in workless 
count, 
 Q2 2000 - Q2 2010 
Change in working-
age population  
Q2 2000 - Q2 2010 
England, Large Cities +1.7 +14.1 
England, London +1.3 +16.7 
England, Other Deprived Areas +4.0 +10.9 
 
These data point to the importance of patterns of regional economic divergence, migration, housing 
allocation mechanisms, and urban development in explaining neighbourhood worklessness trends.  
They provide an important context for looking at policy effects and the limits of policy interventions, and 
we will be exploring more of these underlying factors as part of our ongoing work.    As Figure 8 shows, 
differences between neighbourhoods with different policy interventions do show slightly different trends.  
The graph shows gaps between high worklessness neighbourhoods in NDC and NRF programme areas 
and other neighbourhoods in England, with NDC comparators and all high worklessness areas shown 
for comparison.14    
 
In the NDC areas – by no means all of which were in the highest-worklessness 10% - the excess 
worklessness was almost exactly the same as in the comparator (non-intervention) areas at both the 
start and the end. This does not tell us whether or not employment interventions in the NDC areas were 
effective; since people move, age and die, we are not looking at the same population at each time point.  
Possibly NDC interventions enabled people to get into work and move away.  It does, however, mean 
                                                        
14
 We do not show the WNF districts separately; these were a subset of NRF areas and were pursuing labour-
supply interventions during a period of weakening labour demand, as the post-2008 trends for all neighbourhoods 
shows. 
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that NDC did not succeed in reducing disparities in workless rates – probably to be expected given the 
nature of the programme and its spending profile.   
 
 
 
Note: Values are calculated quarterly as a four-quarter moving average. 
Sources: DWP Working-age client group for small areas (DWP/NOMIS). Mid-year population estimates for LSOAs, England and 
Wales (ONS) 
 
In contrast,  the  workless rate in high worklessness neighbourhoods in  NRF districts fell faster than for 
all high-workless neighbourhoods.  This is certainly partly to do with regional divergence and the varying 
fates of areas with different geography and economic bases rather than with programme interventions.  
Those inside NRF areas were much more likely to be multicultural inner urban districts than deprived 
areas outside NRF districts, and thus more likely to have been influenced by urban economic growth and 
gentrification processes as well as by their NRF spend.  Those with which they were compared 
contained a much larger proportion of small-town, rural and coastal poor neighbourhoods.  Indeed 
econometric modelling conducted as part of the NRF evaluation showed the importance of local 
characteristics. Neighbourhoods with few low skilled jobs within 5km, high proportions of low skilled 
workers and high proportions of social housing saw lower falls in worklessness than other areas.  
Nevertheless the evaluators found a modest effect of NRF spend, controlling for other factors, 
suggesting that about 70,000 of the fall in work deprivation in NRF areas would not have occurred 
without the Fund.  Areas with greater NRF spend were more likely to improve than areas with lower 
spend.  Based on this, they concluded that reductions in worklessness alone constituted value for 
money, with estimated savings of £1.6bn compared with the estimated £312m spent through NRF 
directly on worklessness.        
Figure 8: Gap in neighbourhood worklessness rate for programme areas, 
relative to all non-poor England neighbourhoods 
 31 
 
WP05   Labour’s record on Neighbourhood Renewal in England 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
In 1997, Labour inherited a situation of widening spatial inequality in social and economic outcomes, 
physical environment and standards of public service provision, and severe problems in some ex-
industrial neighbourhoods with almost valueless properties, abandonment, vacant housing, 
environmental decline, and high crime and anti-social behaviour.  The principal response of the previous 
Conservative government during the 1990s had been the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund, 
a funding programme to support thematic or neighbourhood-based regeneration programmes designed 
by local partnerships. 
 
Labour responded to the problems with a significant increase in spending and activity, increasing during 
the 2000s and peaking in 2007/8.  It gave political priority to neighbourhood renewal and established 
new machinery in central and local government for the long term redistribution of resources and services 
towards the poorest areas.   
  
Initial goals were extremely ambitious, and broad, incorporating aims to change the environment, 
amenities and services offered, the capacity of residents to influence change, the effect of 
neighbourhoods on socio-economic outcomes, and to change these outcomes themselves.  At the heart 
of the NSNR was an intention to reform the way that government approached poor neighbourhoods and 
the distribution of resources and services between places, principally on equity grounds.  However, the 
full breadth of these goals was not well reflected in the targets and measures adopted.  Most of the 
statistical targets that were enunciated related to reducing inequalities in individual outcomes, thus 
obscuring from the official record the central importance  to the policy endeavour of place improvements 
per se, efforts to build community capacity and influence, and institutional change.   Equally the targets 
did not, and perhaps were not able to, discriminate between what could reasonably be expected from 
area-based interventions and the effects of aspatial social policies and urban economic change.  
 
Perhaps because of the difficulty in measuring and justifying neighbourhood renewal spend and perhaps 
for other reasons including the increasing influence of the Treasury and of spatial economics, policy 
goals shifted over time.  By 2007, neighbourhood renewal was seen as having primarily an economic 
rationale, tackling worklessness and promoting neighbourhood economic sustainability, rather than a 
fairness rationale, using state spending to equalise the distribution of public goods and opportunities in 
the face of deindustrialisation and social change.  Spending was reduced and more narrowly focused on 
tackling worklessness.   There was a shift of interventions to a larger spatial scale in order to transform 
places and individual outcomes. 
 
This change, however, came relatively late.  By 2007 evidence was indicating that that NRF and 
mainstream central government spending was generating large and noticeable improvements in 
neighbourhood environments and services: for example new childcare centres, health centres, and 
community buildings, better neighbourhood management and policing and reduced crime, a higher 
standard of housing, new school buildings and extended services in schools,  Gaps in neighbourhood 
satisfaction were closing slightly, overall, and residents of programme areas reported that their areas 
were getting better.   In relation to the original ameliorative logic (set out at the start of this report), this 
should be seen as an end in itself. 
 
Gaps in social and economic outcomes were also closing in domains that could be most directly 
influenced by policy, such as school outcomes and deaths from cardio-vascular disease, although less 
so, or not at all, in other domains such as life expectancy.  Worklessness gaps also closed.  However, it 
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is hard to conclude that particular change this was primarily due to neighbourhood renewal policy.  More 
likely changes were due to absorption of marginal labour as the economy expanded in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, combined with the relatively good economic performance of Northern cities and the 
repopulation and gentrification of inner urban areas, particularly but not exclusively in London. Active 
labour market programmes played a contributory role (McKnight 2007).  NRF appears to have a modest 
effect on worklessness reduction. 
 
On the whole, the extent to which the gaps closed was in line with what was expected when targets were 
set.  That neighbourhood disparities in individual outcomes remained large at the end of the period is 
probably what could be expected given the scale of the funding involved and the influence of wider 
economic, social and demographic factors on individual social and economic outcomes.  The 
programmes represented a significant addition to what had gone before but did not fundamentally alter 
the distribution of funding for public services, nor did they initially set out to erase spatial inequalities 
altogether.   
 
The poorest areas now face a period of acute economic pressure as the impact of the financial crash 
and recession hit home. What happens in these neighbourhoods between 2010 and 2014, under the 
Coalition’s new policy regime, will be the focus of our ongoing work in the SPCC research programme. 
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